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President Richard Nixon's historic visit to the People's Republic
of China in 1972, which hastened efforts to normalize relations be-
tween the United States and China, prefaced an explosive growth in
trade between the two countries.' China has since become a major
trading partner of the United States2 but the potential for continued
growth in this relationship is limited by several factors, including
* Steven N. Robinson is an associate with the law firm Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Ham-
ilton in Washington, D.C. Mr. Robinson's principal area of practice is advising financial insti-
tutions regarding regulatory matters. Mr. Robinson received an A.B. in Economics from
Brown University in 1972 and a J.D. from Catholic University of Law in 1984, where he was
an Associate Editor of the Law Review.
** George R. A. Doumar is an associate with Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton in
Washington, D.C. Mr. Doumar was graduated in 1983 from Georgetown University's School
of Foreign Service with a degree in International Economics. Mr. Doumar obtained his law
degree from the University of Virginia School of Law in 1986, where he was a member of the
Law Review and an Articles Editor of the Virginia Journal of International Law. Mr.
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I. The two countries signed a trade agreement in 1979. Agreement on Trade Relations,
July I, 1979, United States - People's Republic of China, 31 U.S.T. 4651, T.I.A.S. No.
9630, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1041 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Trade Agreement]. Bilateral trade
between the United States and China totaled $8.08 billion annually in 1985. CHINA Bus. REV.,
May-June 1986, at 77. U.S. imports from China increased from $1.16 billion in 1980 to $4.22
billion in 1985. U.S. exports to China, which grew rapidly in the late 1970s, grew from $3.75
billion in 1980 to only $3.85 billion in the same period. Id. It is estimated that 1986 levels of
trade totalled approximately $9 billion, with the U.S. trade deficit with China reaching as
much as $1 billion. INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), 1466 (Dec. 3, 1986). See also, Lockett, Dispute
Settlement in the People's Republic of China: The Developing Role of Arbitration in Foreign
Trade and Maritime Disputes 16 J. INTL. LAW AND ECON. 239, 240 (1982) (the writer notes
the explosive growth of trade during the first quarter of 1981). While still growing rapidly,
there are some indications that the rate of growth of trade with and investment in China has
levelled off. See INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), 1287 (Oct. 22, 1986). Foreign investment in China
is estimated to have dropped 20-40% in 1986 over 1985 levels. INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1466
(Dec. 3, 1986).
2. In 1980 the volume of trade with China surpassed the level of trade with the Soviet
Union and China moved into first place as a non-market trading partner with the United
States. Theroux, Technology Sales to China, 14 J. INTL. LAW AND ECON. 185, 186 n.I (1980).
The United States is now China's third largest trading partner after Japan and Hong Kong,
representing approximately 12% of total Chinese trade. See NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR U.S.-
CHINA TRADE, U.S.-CHINA TRADE STATISTICS 1985 (1986), at 4.
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China's ability to generate foreign exchange, 3 the reluctance of the
United States government to allow exports of high technology and
the degree of certainty that can be achieved by the legal system
meant to enforce contracts with businesses in China.
To use its enormous resource base effectively, China has under-
taken an ambitious effort to modernize,4 known as "the Four Mod-
ernizations." 5 Crucial to China's success in this endeavor is its effec-
tive use of international trade to import modern technology;6 but
China must also inspire in trading partners confidence that a legal
system exists under which they can enforce import/export contracts
if it is to develop successful trading relationships with other countries
and attract sought-after technologies and investment. This article
examines the influence Chinese attitudes toward law have upon the
various methods of dispute resolution in United States-China trade.
It concludes that, although reasonably effective mechanisms for the
resolution of disputes are available, the primary emphasis of counsel
should be to prevent the dispute from occurring through promoting
informed negotiation of the original contract. 8
II. Chinese Attitudes Toward Law
China since earliest recorded times has considered itself to be
the "middle kingdom" and the center of life.' The effect of tradition
is omnipresent in China and, in particular, the attitude toward the
3. The shortage of foreign exchange has proved to be a particularly critical brake on
increased trade in the past two years. See Gelatt, The Foreign Exchange Quandary, CHINA
Bus. REV., May-June 1986, at 28; Stuermer, The Foreign Exchange Situation, CHINA Bus.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 14.
4. Some have suggested that China's modernization program was somewhat over-ambi-
tious at the outset, and reductions in the pace of expansion experienced occasionally since 1979
simply indicate a more realistic approach to planning. See, Surrey, Trade and Economic Rela-
tions with the People's Republic of China: Recent Developments, 14 INT'L LAW. 15, 15-16
(1980). Cf. Lockett, supra, note 1, at I & n.6. China's modernization program is currently
under intense debate and review within Chinese political circles. See, e.g., International Strug-
gle Soils China Trade, J. Comm., Feb. 18, 1987, at 4A; Mixed Signals from China Point to
Policy Struggle, J. Comm., Mar. 4, 1987, at 3A.
5. The Four Modernizations are those of agriculture, industry, defense, and science and
technology. See THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, BUSINESS PROFILE
SERIES: THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 6 (3d ed. 1980). For a general description of the
"Four Modernizations," see Theroux, supra note 2, at 188-195. See also, Comment, China,
Modernization, and Sino-United States Trade: Will China Submit to Arbitration?, 10 CALIF.
W. INT'L L.J. 53, 55-56 (1980). For a voluminous examination of Chinese development, see
Selected Papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United
States, China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000: The Four Modernizations (Volume 1),
99th Cong. 2d Sess., (Comm. Print 1986).
6. See Theroux, supra note 2, at 195.
7. Id. at 207.
8. Chief Judge Re, of the United States Court of International Trade, has suggested
that a vital role for lawyers is to act as a counselor and to prevent litigation. See Re, The
Lawyer as Counselor and the Prevention of Litigation, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 685 (1982). It
should be required reading for all law students and lawyers!
9. J. COHEN & H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1974), quoted
in Comment, supra note 5, at 57-58 & n. 33.
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legal system reflects many influences from the past. To understand
current Chinese dispute resolution methods, it is necessary first to
examine the evolution of Chinese attitudes toward law.
A. "ii" and 'fa". The Conflict Between Legalism and Moralism
Two central themes, which are somewhat diametrically opposed,
have principally influenced the development of the Chinese philoso-
phy of law. The Confucian concept of "li" postulates that ethics
should control one's behavior and that seeking harmony with the
universe provides sufficient guidance to conduct one's affairs.'
Under this view, moral precepts regulate behavior in society, and law
and litigation are unnecessary, improper means of controlling con-
duct." This emphasis on customary principles also means that one's
station in life dictates expected standards of behavior.' The "li" in-
fluence is reflected in a graduated scale of criminal punishments, the
punishments being hierarchically structured to correlate with social
standing.'"
On the other hand, the legalists espoused a concept of "fa,"
which was a stricter view of the law as "codified in books, kept in
government offices, and promulgated among the hundred sur-
names."' 14 From the time of the development of the legalist philoso-
phy in the third century B.C. until the present, tension has existed
between the written codes of laws enforceable by governmentally im-
posed punishment and the natural order required by the community
and enforced by social pressure.' 5
The historical tension between the "li" and "fa" influences in
Chinese history exemplifies the Asian idea of the Yin-Yang, the con-
cept that everything is made up of two forces or elements: the strong
and weak, active and passive, positive and negative. Similarly, it re-
flects the Marxist concept of the dialectic, which suggests that his-
torical development occurs only through the continual resolution of
conflict between a thesis and its corresponding antithesis.'
10. See H. KIM, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHINA AND THE WEST: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY 1-23 (1980) for a detailed discussion of the origins of legal thought in China.
II. See Lee, Chinese Communist Law: Its Background and Development, 6 MICH. L.
REV. 439, 440-42 (1962).
12. See Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist
China, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1284, 1290-91 (1967).
13. See, e.g., id. at 1291.
14. KIM, supra note 10, at 3-4 & n. 12 (quoting W. LIAO, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
HAN FEi Tzu (1939)). See also Ellis & Shea, Foreign Commercial Dispute Settlement in the
People's Republic of China, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 155, 157 (1981). The legalist influence
reached its height during the time of the Q'in dynasty, from 221-208 B.C. A backlash against
the harshness of this regime led to its overthrow and replacement by the Confucian Han
dynasty.
15. See Lubman, supra note 12, at 1291.
16. For a discussion of the analogy between Chinese and Marxist thought, see H.
Holtzmann, A New Look at Resolving Disputes in US-China Trade, in A NEW LOOK AT
Spring 1987]
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With the advent of Communist control of China in 1949, the
moralist principles of the "li" prevailed over the "fa,"' 7 resulting in
the abolition of the legal codes in the 1950s.18 This abolition re-
flected a preference by the Chinese Communist leaders for a formal
legal system rather than for the codes themselves. 9 As a noted
scholar observed, "law was not regarded as a major social achieve-
ment and a symbol of rectitude, but as a regrettable necessity to be
used by the state to enforce its will upon subjects who refused to
submit to alternative means of social control." 20
B. Early Chinese Experience with International Law
China's early exposure to international law resulted in dis-
enchantment similar to that the Chinese had with their own court
system. The growth of trade with the outside world in the 1800s
brought the smuggling of opium into China.2 1 China's Imperial
Commissioner Lin Tse-hsu 22 became acquainted with Vattel's The
Law of Nations and sought to employ its legal concepts to stop for-
eign nations' smuggling efforts.23 Pursuant to Vattel's suggestions,
Commissioner Lin wrote to Queen Victoria, seeking assistance in re-
straining her citizens from their illegal trading.
Instead, Britain started and won the first Opium War (1839-
1842) and imposed even more onerous trading conditions on China,
including increased levels of opium smuggling. 24 The Chinese view
this period of their history as one of "exploitation and humilia-
LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA: DEVELOPMENTS A YEAR AFTER RECOGNI-
TION 261-62 (H. Holtzmann & W. Surrey eds. 1979). For a discussion of the dialectic ap-
proach in Chinese trade law, see Chew, The Resolution of Transnational Commercial Dis-
putes in the People's Republic of China: A Guide for U.S. Practitioners, 8 YALE J. W. PUB.
ORD. 236, 253 n. 121 (1982). See also Leng, The Role of Law in the People's Republic of
China as Reflecting Mao Tse-Tung's Influence, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 356, 357
(1977) (noting the tension between formal and societal rules).
17. E.g., Comment, supra note 5, at 60-61. The Nationalist government originally estab-
lished by Sun Yat-Sen in 1912 attempted intermittently to develop a Western-style legal sys-
tem, though this effort never reached fruition.
18. Id. at 62.
19. Id. at 60.
20. COHEN & CHIU, quoted in Comment, supra note 5, at 60.
21. See Comment, supra note 5, at 59.
22. This paper will use the Wade-Giles transliteration system for some historical and
other names that may be more familiar to the readers under this classification. The Pinyin
system currently employed by China will be used for all other names.
23. See Comment, supra note 5, at 58.
24. Id. The Chinese were victimized by unfair trading conditions during the remainder
of the 19th century through the use of the "Unequal Treaties" system by which European
powers imposed severe trading conditions. See Lubman, Trade Between the United States and
the People's Republic of China: Practice, Policy & Law, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1, 3-4
(1976). The United States responded in the late 1800s with the "Open Door" policy, which
called for the opening of the Chinese trade to all nations but did not help the Chinese. See
JENKINS, DEALING WITH THE CHINESE: SOME OBSERVATIONS OF A DIPLOMAT IN CHINA
TRADE: PROSPECTS AND PERSPECTIVES 48, 49 (Buxbaum and Reynolds, eds. 1982).
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tion. '' 25 Not surprisingly, the Chinese developed a distrust of interna-
tional law, viewing it "just like Chinese statutory law - unreasona-
ble and unreliable. If there is a right without might the right will not
prevail."
20
Lacking the military might to enforce its desires on its trading
partners, China withdrew from participation in the world's economy
in 1949 and only during the past fifteen years has it begun to renew
its contacts. In view of the previous disastrous experience with inter-
national law, it is understandable that China has been reluctant to
whole-heartedly accept the Western legal establishment.
C. The Ebb and Flow of Legalism in China
Following the revolution in 1949, China initially relied on medi-
ation to settle civil disputes.27 With the rise in the influence of the
Soviet Union in China, the Chinese adopted a "Soviet-style" legal
system in 1953. 23 This system was abolished in 1957, and from that
point until Mao Tse-Tung's death in 1976, a more traditional com-
munity mediation system gradually replaced the country's formal le-
gal system. 29 The decimation of the legal structure accelerated dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution to the point that there were virtually no
active lawyers, judges, legal scholars or courts in all of China.30 The
attitude toward the legal system during that period is best repre-
sented by a quote from Chairman Mao stating "Depend on the rule
of man, not the rule of law."31
The dependence on the rule of man was not without significant
drawbacks.3 2 Since Mao's death, China's present leaders, recogniz-
ing these shortcomings, have reversed the trend of the previous
twenty years and have attempted to build a formal legal structure.
Several important legal codes have been enacted to meet both na-
tional and international issues and gain from its citizens and trading
partners the confidence essential to a successful modernization cam-
paign. 3
25. See Theroux, supra note 2, at 188.
26. COHEN & CHIu, quoted in Comment, supra note 5, at 59.
27. See Lubman, supra note 12, at 1285-86.
28. Comment, supra note 5, at 61-62.
29. Id. at 62.
30. Hsia, Sources of Law in the People's Republic of China: Recent Developments, 14
INT'L. LAw. 25, 27 (1980). This article also provides an excellent analysis of the status of legal
literature in China. See also Comment, supra note 5, at 62 & n.72.
31. Mao Zedong, quoted in Leng, supra note 16, at 356.
32. The prospect of arbitrary punishment bred fear and uncertainty among the popula-
tion and had a corresponding adverse impact on economic growth. The uncertainty inherent in
not having a formal legal system also retarded the growth of international business
relationships.
33. See supra note 4.
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To gain the trust of its own citizens, 34 a comprehensive Consti-
tution was established in 1978, which has partially eliminated fears
of arbitrary punishment. 35 In addition, a legal education program
was recently instituted among the populace"6 and formal arbitration
committees were established all over the country to settle local dis-
putes.3 7 Similarly, in the past ten years China has established a
framework of laws to provide foreign investors and trading partners
the certainty required to enter into substantial trade agreements.38
Some of the major laws which have been enacted address joint ven-
tures (1979), taxation (1980), investment generally (various times),
trademark (1982), patent protection (1984), foreign economic con-
tracts (1985), and wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries (1986).3 9 The
effects of China's new trade laws are just beginning to be felt, and
the results of this trend toward legalism, while not without
problems," appear extremely favorable.
41
34. Jerome Cohen has stated "If you want people to participate in the modernization
movement, you must guarantee them some protection against arbitrary rule. New ideas aren't
going to come forth if it pays to keep your mouth shut." Quoted in Comment, supra note 5, at
63 n.79.
35. See Comment, supra note 5, at 79-80. An English translation of the 1978 Constitu-
tion can be found in HSIA & HAUN. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 111 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1978).
36. Approximately two-thirds of the officials in China's leading central departments
have engaged in legal studies since the fall of 1985. China Daily, October 3, 1986, at 3.
37. Approximately one billion economic contracts have been signed in China. China
Daily, Jan. 13, 1986, at 3. Reflecting the Chinese attitude that "A lawsuit breeds ten years of
hatred," most disputes under these contracts are resolved through mediation. China Daily,
Dec. 22, 1986, at 4. Chinese officials have stated that approximately 70% of such disputes
are resolved through mediation by local arbitration committees. Id. It is estimated that a total
of 6.47 million civil disputes (excluding domestic relation cases) were resolved by such media-
tion in 1984. China Daily, Aug. 19, 1985, at 1.
38. See, e.g., Theroux, supra note 2, at 206-09 for a discussion of the development of
China's emerging legal structure. See also, Hsia, supra note 30, at 27-30; Ellis & Shea, supra,
note 14 at 158.
39. The groundwork for the later enactments was laid by the adoption of the law of the
People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures, adopted July I, 1979, reprinted in Beijing Rev.,
July 20, 1979 at 24 [hereinafter Joint Venture Law]. For an analysis of the Chinese Joint
Venture Law and its practical application, see Note, The New Legal Framework for Joint
Ventures in China, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 1005 (1984); Recent Development, 15 GA. J.
INT'L L. 389 (1985). China revised its joint venture law in the fall of 1986, promulgating 21
new articles to grant the over 1300 joint ventures (a 1985 Chinese estimate) increased auton-
omy, especially in the high technology and export sectors. An English translation and short
analysis of the new law appears in Cohen & Chang, New Foreign Investment Provisions,
CHINA BUS. REV., Jan-Feb. 1987, at 11-15.
Developments in Chinese procedural law should not be overlooked by foreign investors.
The Tentative Law on Civil Procedure (1982) contains several provisions (Articles 192-95)
applicable to arbitrations involving foreign trade. China also adopted General Principles of
Civil Law in 1986 that will have ancillary effects on foreign trade. See Cohen, China Adopts
Civil Law Principles, CHINA BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 48.
40. Internally, the certainty of a formal legal structure with some assured rights for
citizens may have contributed to demonstrations against the government in early 1987, which
provoked a backlash against any form of dissent. See China's Anti-Westernization Drive Won't
Threaten Cultural Exchanges, J. Comm., Mar. 2, 1987, at 4A. Externally, disputes involving
foreign parties have increased, China has experienced severe foreign exchange shortages, and
foreign investment in China dropped an estimated 20-40% in 1986 over 1985 levels. See supra
note 1.
41. For a history of the legal profession in China, see Leung, The Re-Emergence of the
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III. The Nature of U.S.-China Trade
Three essential objectives form the basis for China's trade pol-
icy: Importing high technology, establishing joint ventures and ob-
taining investment capital and foreign exchange. China principally
seeks to increase the importation of high technology and the exporta-
tion of its own goods. It concurrently seeks to establish joint ventures
in China with its trading partners. Working together, these two
objectives are designed to help China develop its own production ca-
pabilities using modern technology. This drive to modernize pervades
China's new trade laws and is characterized by the slogan: "Buy
hens that lay eggs. '"42 Finally, because China traditionally has been
reluctant to become a major borrower, its leaders have striven to
maintain a balance between imports and exports. Mao strongly op-
posed borrowing from other nations43 and only during the past few
years has China sought loans and investment from outside sources.
4 4
To obtain and maintain this investment, China must demonstrate
continued financial and political stability.
IV. China's Trading Establishment
Chinese citizens cannot enter into export or import contracts on
their own behalf.45 The organizations originally most involved in car-
rying out China's plans for trade were the Foreign Trade Corpora-
tions (FTCs). These government entities were established primarily
under the purview of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFERT),
and were granted both import and export functions.46 The FTCs
traded on behalf of end-users and producers, thus the consumer fre-
Legal Profession in The People's Republic of China, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 275
(1985). An indication of the acceptance of the legal renaissance in China is the growth in the
number of attorneys permitted to practice in China. In 1978, there were two private attorneys
practicing in China. By 1980 that number had increased to 1,600. Theroux, supra note 2, at
211 n.64. An informal estimate put the number of lawyers in China as of early 1985 at
18,500. Horsley, Comments on Laws and Legal Developments Affecting Foreign Investment in
China, 3 CHINA L. REP. 175, 176 (1986). China's Ministry of Justice estimated in 1986 that
there were 10,000 Chinese lawyers, and projected that the number would reach 100,000 by the
year 2000. China Daily, Oct. 6, 1986, at 3.
42. Theroux, supra note 2, at 195.
43. For a discussion of the reluctance of the Chinese to become dependent on the outside
world, see Theroux supra note 2, at 188-95.
44. Id. at 191-92. To make foreign investment more attractive, China has established
the Chinese International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) with the responsibility
of administering foreign investment agreements. For an English version of CITIC's charter, id.
at 198-200. China has increasingly turned to the international bond market for funds, raising
over $1 billion through this method during the past four years. China Daily, Jul. 9, 1986, at I
(Business); China has not attempted to obtain financing in the United States because of un-
resolved claims related to bonds of the Imperial Chinese Government. These claims have re-
cently been dismissed see Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, (1 Ith Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1371 (1987).
45. Theroux, supra note 2, at 214.
46. Id. at 196.
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quently was unaware of the actual producer or end-user involved in a
transaction. 47 Since 1980, the number of entities analogous to FTCs,
but created under ministries other than MOFERT has steadily in-
creased, effectively diluting the role of MOFERT.
The structure and legal status of FTCs remain undefined be-
cause their charters generally have not been made public. They do
not have assets abroad, nor do they have foreign offices, although
they have used representatives in the United States;48 therefore, the
FTCs are essentially immune from process or liens against their as-
sets except in China.
Equally important in the conduct of foreign trade is the China
Council for Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) 9 and three
of its subdivisions: the Foreign Economic Trade Arbitration Com-
mittee (FETAC), the Maritime Arbitration Committee (MAC) and
the Legal Affairs Department. Since maritime disputes are beyond
the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that MAC is FETAC's mari-
time analogue.
The Legal Affairs Department is the working arm and coordi-
nating body for the two arbitration committees. It plays a significant
role in the resolution of disputes at all stages and works in harmony
with the committees. The former Director of the Legal Affairs De-
partment, Ren Jianxin, who was also the Secretary General of both
committees and is currently Vice President of the People's Supreme
Court in Peking, was instrumental in developing a structure for dis-
pute resolution in United States-China trade.50 In 1980, the Legal
Affairs Department under Ren Jianxin established a Legal Advisor's
Office, which is responsible for providing advice to foreigners doing
business with China.5 1 Furthermore, the Legal Affairs Department is
in charge of administering the 1976 agreement between the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association (AAA) and the CCPIT to conduct joint
conciliation of disputes. 2
47. Id. at 197. Note, however, that to some extent individual enterprises have gained
authority to negotiate trade contracts. See Mitchell & Stein, United States-China Commercial
Contracts, 20 INT'L LAW 897 (1986). It is unclear whether this trend will continue or be
reversed in light of the current debate over modernization.
48. Id. at 197.
49. Id.
50. Ellis & Shea, supra note 14, at 163. See MCMILLAN, ATTITUDES OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRADE (ABA Section on International
Law Monograph No. 2 1979). See the following CCPIT monographs for Ren Jianxin's views:
R. JIANXIN. DISCUSSIONS ON SOME ASPECTS OF U.S-CHINA TRADE (1982); R. JIANXIN,
CHINA'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND TRADE-LAW WORK IN PROGRESSING (1981); R. JIANXIN,
SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF OUR IMPORT OF TECHNOLOGY AND UTILIZATION OF FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENT (1980) reprinted in I China L. Rep. 85 1980. For a more recent view from the
Legal Affairs Department, see W. SHOUMAO, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC
CONTRACT LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1985 (CCPIT Monograph 1985).
51. Theroux, supra note 2, at 208.
52. Although no written agreement was entered into between the two organizations, it
[Vol. 5:2
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FETAC plays an important role in international trade by facili-
tating the settlement of disputes at all stages. 11 FETAC was origi-
nally created in 1954 as the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission,
but in 1980 the importance of the other economic aspects of China's
development was recognized and given more emphasis by adding the
word "Economic" to the title.54 FETAC now has jurisdiction for dis-
putes arising under trade contracts, financing agreements and joint
ventures.5 5 FETAC's primary function is to conduct arbitration. This
may be done pursuant to the guidelines established in FETAC's Pro-
visional Rules of Procedure, which were published in 1956 and are
still in effect, or under other agreed upon rules.56 The procedures for
arbitration will be discussed below.
V. The American Counterparts
The types of American entities doing business with China are
more varied and more difficult to define, yet at the same time their
legal nature is more familiar, thus, less interesting. They are corpo-
rations and individuals who recognize the potential market for and
source of produced goods and raw materials. The most important
characteristic about their legal nature from the dispute resolution
standpoint is that they can be sued in American courts for non-rec-
was widely publicized in both countries. For a discussion of the arrangement, see Holtzmann,
supra note 16, at 288-291.
53. Over 90% of all cases in which FETAC or MAC participate are resolved prior to
arbitration. Id. at 255.
54. Ellis & Shea, supra note 14, at 164. See I.J. WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBI-
TRAL PROCESS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, 527-40 (1979). Article 5 of the Law of Foreign Eco-
nomic Contracts specifies that Chinese law must govern all joint venture, cooperative venture
and natural resource exploitation contracts. International law may apply if Chinese law does
not address a certain practice. See M. FERGUSON, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND LICENSING
AGREEMENTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (International Trade Administration
Monograph No. 22 1986).
55. Ellis & Shea, supra note 14, at 164-65. The economic sections of the People's
Courts may also hear disputes involving foreign contracts. A claim involving foreign contracts
can be brought in the economic section of the Intermediate People's Court. These bodies allow
only Chinese lawyers to practice before them, although a foreign lawyer may be present. See
L. FUNG, CHINA TRADE HANDBOOK 255 (1984). It should be noted, however, that when an
official of the Ministry of Justice was queried whether the Economic Courts have had any
cases which had any impact on trade, he was unaware of any cases which had been heard by
the courts regarding trade. Discussed during telephone interview of Ms. Jeanne Chiang, Na-
tional Council on United States-China Trade, by Mr. Steven Robinson (April 7, 1983) [here-
inafter Chiang Interview].
56. Theroux, Arbitration in China? You may need a Chinese Lawyer, CHINESE BUS.
REV. May-June 1982 at 38. For a comparison of other systems of international commercial
arbitration with the FETAC rules, see Lockett, supra note I, at 247-257. See also Ellis &
Shea, supra note 14, at 164-68. Use of FETAC has become increasingly popular in recent
years. The membership of FETAC has been increased from 21 to 65. 1985 saw FETAC par-
ticipate in over 50 arbitrations, 80 mediations, and 100 consultations. See China's Foreign
Economic and Trade Arbitration is Gradually Being Perfected, Hong Kong Liaowong Over-
seas Edition, Jan. 27, 1986, at 4. Another source stated that 60 arbitration cases involving
foreign firms were brought before FETAC in 1985. Beijing Rev., No. 18, p. 28 (1986). Ninety
such cases had been brought in the first II months of 1986. China Daily, Dec. 22, 1986, at 4.
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ognition of arbitral awards. 57
A private, non-profit organization whose role cannot be overem-
phasized is the National Council for United States-China Trade
(NCUST). Established in 1973, the NCUST serves as a conduit for
information and advice to facilitate bilateral work. With offices in
Washington and Beijing, the NCUST has a wealth of information
and expertise available to entities wishing to engage in United
States-China trade. "
VI. Business Aspects Unique to United States-China Trade
Any one of a number of factors unique to China trade, if not
recognized by the foreign party during the initial negotiation of a
business agreement, has the potential for creating otherwise easily
avoidable disputes. The foremost factor that should be borne in mind
is the tenacity of Chinese negotiators in the process of determining
the terms of a contract. Chinese negotiating teams are extremely
well-prepared and diligent in their approach to business, and expect
contract terms to be taken exactly as written. 59 Contracts are re-
duced to writing in English and are straight-forward in nature. The
negotiations are highly technical and detailed, so it is important that
the negotiators have substantial technical knowledge. At the same
time, the Chinese look to cultivate long-term relationships and are
quite patient in negotiations. 60 The Chinese can take a long time to
make decisions, since negotiators typically must clear their actions
with higher authorities.61 Patience is thus a necessity for the Ameri-
can side.
Negotiations are frequently conducted in two steps. First the
technical, working level discussions are held, and if successful, dis-
cussions move on to the business aspects. 62 Although some have ex-
pressed concern that the Chinese object to legal counsel's presence
57. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the validity of binding international ar-
bitration clauses in Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). The United States is a
signatory to U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New
York Convention]. Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang proposed last fall that China accede to the
New York Convention, see China Daily, Nov. 28, 1986 at I, and China has since done so.
58. A brochure describing the functions of the National Council is available from
NCUST at 1818 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
59. For an excellent discussion of considerations involved in Chinese contract negotia-
tions, see Theroux, supra note 2, at 210-12.
60. See R. TUNG, U.S.-CHINA TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 69 (1982).
61. See J. DEPAUW, U.S.-CHINESE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 50 (1981).
62. Technical seminars often pave the way for negotiations. See id. at 55. Once negotia-
tions begin, the Chinese often wear down the other side with technical questions. Id. at 59. In
practice, it is often difficult to keep the technical and business negotiations separate. Id. at 60.




during negotiations, this generally has not been the case. " Since
most negotiations are conducted in China, 64 the practice of negotiat-
ing technical aspects first, followed by price and terms, can pose
problems if the American technical team leaves and the commercial
team is not familiar with the technical aspects. The commercial
team must be sure not to disturb the technical agreement and the
technical team must be aware that its promises of performance will
be noted by the Chinese and could very well become a warranty in
the contract. 5
Warranty and quality terms of contracts are crucial to the Chi-
nese and often subject to dispute; therefore the contracting parties
must strive for precision with respect to these terms. Optimally, the
parties should be prepared to demonstrate all warranties and quali-
ties using agreed-upon tests."
All contracts covering the importation of goods or merchandise
to China will call for inspection and acceptance to occur in China by
the China Commodities Inspection Bureau. 67 The Bureau is noted
for its meticulousness in inspections and adherence to the details of
the contract. " As for contracts covering exports from China, claims
for damaged goods arriving in United States ports will be rendered
invalid if the Chinese present a certificate of final inspection showing
the goods were in good condition upon departure from China."9 This
uneven treatment might lead to disputes between trading partners,
particularly where a United States firm is involved in both importing
and exporting.
A similar disparity in application has traditionally existed in the
interpretation of force majeure clauses included in contracts.70 Ex-
port contracts from China will relieve the seller from liability should
force majeure intervene and make performance impossible. How-
ever, in import contracts, the Chinese have typically been more re-
strictive in their view as to what qualifies as a force majeure. Ameri-
can terms referring to "acts of God" were not viewed as effective to
the Chinese because as one party was told: "He's your God, we're
63. Theroux, supra note 2, at 210.
64. Most negotiations are conducted in either Peking or Guangzhow, DEPAUW, supra
note 61, at 56, though some contracts have been negotiated by telex. Id. The Guangzhow
Trade Fair has typically been an important method for making contacts with the Chinese. See
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND TRADE, GUIDE TO CHINA'S FOREIGN Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS AND TRADE: IMPORT-EXPORT SPECIAL 367 (1984).
65. See Theroux, supra note 2, at 213.
66. Id. at 223. The Chinese also typically attempt to incorporate servicing arrangements
into contracts.
67. Id. at 221.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 222.
70. Id. at 225-26. Such clauses in U.S.-China trade typically do not specify the events
constituting a force majeure. See DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA (ITA) supra note 62, at 15,
16.
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not responsible for him." 7 This attitude has changed and some Chi-
nese FTCs now will agree that conditions beyond the control of the
parties, including acts of God and labor unrest, may constitute a
valid force majeure.
Clauses excusing performance for labor strikes are generally not
recognized where the strike is against the party in the contract. This
stems from the Chinese view that unions would not be striking if the
management had been proper in its conduct of business. Therefore,
the Chinese view a strike as a matter within the control of the con-
tracting party.73 On the other hand, strikes against a sub-contractor
may be viewed as sufficient excuse for non-performance.
Divergent views regarding the valuation of contributions to a
joint venture also are likely to result in disputes. The contributions of
each party need not be cash, but may be in goods, knowledge, or
services as well. Unless parties are clear in their definition of the
means for evaluating these contributions, disagreement may arise
over the actual value which should be used. Whereas the American
company may present audited books or financial statements to jus-
tify the value of its contribution, the Chinese are critically short of
accountants74 and their books might very well be state secrets that
cannot be disclosed.
Because each of these aspects of business with China represents
a considerably different approach to business than American compa-
nies might be accustomed to, the potential for serious disputes over
simple misunderstandings exists. Parties entering into trade with
China therefore must utilize counsel experienced in China trade or
seek advice from an entity such as the NCUST prior to entering into
contract negotiations. Disputes can be minimized through con-
ducting informed discussions prior to entering into a contract, rather
than allowing a vague term to remain in the contract to expedite
negotiations.
VII. Philosophical Concepts Underlying Foreign Trade with China
China's approach to dispute resolution cannot be fully under-
stood by reference alone to its unique perspective on legal systems.
In reality, several factors merge to create an integrated mechanism.
While broken down here into separate concepts to aid discussion,
71. Theroux, supra note 2, at 226 n. 88.
72. See DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA (ITA) supra note 62, at 16.
73. See supra note 72 for the notion that labor strikes may now be accepted in some
instances as a valid force majeure.
74. Theroux, supra note 2, at 250. The international accounting firm of Coopers &
Lybrand has embarked on a training program for Chinese accountants to meet this need. Id.
at 250 n. 186. Similarly, Baker & Mackenzie, with the Beijing Institute of Foreign Trade, has
established a training program for Chinese legal specialists. Id. at 208 n. 59.
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China's holistic philosophy is indivisible and more accurately repre-
sented by the dialectic theory explained above. 5 The first three con-
cepts discussed are the guiding principles of the arbitration commis-
sions, FETAC and MAC, although they are not limited to those
contexts but pervade the Chinese view of foreign trade.7  Though
once thought derived from the principles of "foreign policy given by
Chairman Mao, these concepts have retained their importance in the
Post-Mao era."'7 The remaining concepts apply generally to the Chi-
nese attitude toward dispute resolution in an international context.
A. Independence
Independence requires that the initiative be kept in China's con-
trol and that ideas and policies should not be forced on China from
outside.7 8 It permits the adoption of foreign ideas and practices, so
long as they are not coerced and China's best interests are served.
B. Consistency with International Trade Practices
This policy acknowledges that trade objectives are often accom-
plished through accommodating other nations' interests by requiring
evaluation of and conformity to standard international practices
whenever possible. 71 At times compliance with this policy may re-
quire that China's independence be sacrificed.
C. Equality and Mutual Benefit
Balancing China's interests with those of its trading partners is
paramount.' 0 Exploitation of a trading partner is frowned upon and
fairness is a prime consideration. This policy serves as a reiteration
of the inter-related nature of the first two concepts and the constant
juxtaposition of thesis and antithesis.
D. The Courts as Dispute Resolution Forums
Although the focus of this paper is on the alternatives to the
75. Id. at 200-01. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
76. Holtzmann, supra note 16, at 267; MCMILLAN, supra note 50, at 3. Another impor-
tant attitude of the Chinese is a desire for their trading partners to realize a reasonable profit
on any transaction. As contrary as this might seem to the Marxist view that profits represent
exploitation by the capitalists of the masses, the reasoning behind the Chinese view is very
pragmatic. They fear that if their trading partner is not satisfied with the contract profits, then
the partner will not perform in a satisfactory manner, resulting in poor service for the Chinese.
Chiang interview, supra note 56. See also U.S. Helps Chinese With Managerial Skills, J.
Comm., Mar. 4, 1987, at 4A (quoting the Dean of a Chinese business school as saying, with
respect to all businessmen, that "profits are the major measure of performance.").
77. Holtzmann, supra note 16, at 279.
78. Chew, supra note 16, at 249-50; MCMILLAN, supra note 50, at 4.
79. MCMILLAN, supra note 50, at 4, 8.
80. Chew, supra note 16, at 250-51; MCMILLAN, supra note 50, at 4, 8.
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court system, the court system is a potential means for solving dis-
putes. One commentator has pointed out that "[n]othing in the
[United States-China] Trade Agreement prevents Chinese foreign
trade organizations or American corporations from litigating in
American or Chinese courts." 81 Although the Chinese are averse to
litigation, Ren Jianxin told an ABA delegation that "[i]f either of
the parties wishes to approach the court, we have no objection." 82
China has created "Economic Courts" within the People's Courts for
the purpose of handling disputes over economic matters including
foreign trade.8
E. Combination of Methods
The Chinese do not view the various methods of dispute resolu-
tion as discrete, separable functions. Rather, the least formal method
of dispute resolution, friendly negotiations, will be utilized even
while the parties have reached the arbitration stage. This belief that
the parties should continue to resolve their differences at the lowest
level in the hierarchy of legal forms allows negotiation and concilia-
tion to continue as dispute resolution progresses to the next method.
Howard Holtzmann, a noted scholar on Chinese trade, described this
blending as similar to "a fine Peking glass bottle, there may be sev-
eral layers, each with a different hue, each visible as a separate en-
tity, yet all blending together to create a total pattern."' 84 Holtzmann
attributed the unusually high percentage of settlements prior to arbi-
tration to the concept of combination. 85
F. "Seeking Truth Through Facts"
This principle is inherent in all types of dispute settlement in
China. The fact finding or investigation of the parties and the concil-
iators, mediators or arbitrators is extremely important to arriving at
a just solution. Holtzmann suggests that parties involved in concilia-
tion will do better to "marshall their facts" than to rely on
rhetoric. 86
G. Not Disturbing the Relationship
Rooted in the tradition of harmony with the universe, the Chi-
nese view toward friendship is extremely important in trade. The
81. See Holtzmann, supra note 16, at 245.
82. Id.
83. These courts have not had a significant impact in the foreign trade sector. See supra
note 55.
84. Holtzmann, supra note 16, at 247.
85. Id. at 255-56.
86. Id. at 280.
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concept of an "old friend" is especially strong in the Orient and en-
compasses a broad view of loyalty and trust. The development of a
friendly relationship should be of vital concern to American parties
seeking to enter into China trade. The Chinese are extremely loyal
customers and once faith is gained in a trading partner, the negotia-
tion of contracts and settlement of potential disputes can be short-
ened considerably. For example, the Chinese trading corporations
frequently are unable to agree to a monetary damage settlement of a
present contract due to budgetary constraints, but will assure their
partner that a future contract will be made more advantageous to
make up for their inability to settle on this contract.87 This concern
with the long range effects contrasts sharply with the typical Ameri-
can desire for short-range settlements.
H. "Dividing One into Two"
An essential concept to conciliators in China trade is that of
"dividing one into two." This concept stresses that there are usually
two points of view regarding each element of dispute, with the role
of the conciliators being to educate the parties regarding the points
of view that they may be considering. The Chinese view this as one
of the most important functions of the conciliators. The application
of this concept is demonstrated by one of the telexes sent by the
Chinese during the joint conciliation conducted by FETAC and the
AAA: 8"
We are of the opinion that it is unreasonable for only one side to
claim against the other without considering the case of loss and
the fact that both sides have sustained losses. Under these cir-
cumstances both companies should proceed in the spirit of
friendship, cooperation and mutual understanding not only tak-
ing the interests of one's own side into consideration, otherwise
it would be quite impossible to resolve the dispute, what is more
it would not be beneficial to the future development of friend-
ship and trade relations between both sides.
87. Id. at 282. The same point was discussed during Chiang interview, supra note 56.
88. Holtzmann, supra note 16, at 301. See Chew, supra note 16, at 268-69; MCMILLAN,
supra note 50, at 9. For a step-by-step description of one of the only two conciliations con-
ducted in U.S.-China trade, see Holtzmann, supra note 16, at 291-317. Holtzmann was an
observer during the conciliation. One interesting point was a comparison of the fact statements
filed by the two parties. The American party filed a brief that was 45 pages long and sup-
ported by 14 exhibits citing numerous related legal principles and facts, and prepared as if to
enter American style litigation. On the other hand, the Chinese statement was a short, simple
description of the facts with brief references to any evidence supporting them. It also empha-
sized the concepts of Chinese dispute resolution. Id. at 299-300.
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VIII. Methods of Dispute Resolution
There are essentially four methods of dispute resolution, exclud-
ing the courts, available in United States-China trade. These meth-
ods, known by various names, represent isolated points along a con-
tinuum of methods. For the purpose of this discussion, we consider
the four alternatives to be: (1) friendly negotiations or consultations;
(2) conciliation; (3) joint conciliation with non-binding recommenda-
tions for settlement; and (4) arbitration. Standard form contracts
provided by the FTCs frequently state that disputes will be resolved
through friendly negotiations, and failing there, they may be re-
solved through arbitration.8 9
The two steps of conciliation are not required,90 but are strongly
encouraged, and in view of the aversity of the Chinese toward litiga-
tion and other forums which impose solutions on the parties, it can
reasonably be assumed that prior to reaching arbitration a dispute
will first pass through the other stages. These methods are discussed
sequentially, bearing in mind the concept of combination which
tends to blur the demarcation of each method. 91
A. Friendly Negotiations
As distinguished from contract negotiations, "friendly negotia-
tions" or "consultations" are terms of art referring to the process of
exchanging letters, telexes and visits in an attempt to resolve dis-
putes between two parties, with no involvement by an outside
party.92 Experience has indicated that friendly negotiations can be
lengthy, but the concept is based on the assent of both parties to
89. See, e.g., Ellis & Shea, supra note 14, at 161. Examples of such clauses, from the
SHANGHAI OVERSEAS INVESTMENT UTILIZATION MANUAL (1985), at 495, follow:
Any disputes arising from the execution of, or in connection with the con-
tract shall be settled through friendly consultations between both parties. In case
settlement cannot be reached through consultations, the disputes shall be sub-
mitted to the Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission of the China
Council for the Promotion of International Trade for arbitration in accordance
with, its rules or procedure. The arbitral award is final and binding upon both
parties.
or.
Any disputes arising from the execution of, or in connection with the con-
tract shall be settled through friendly consultations between both parties. In case
no settlement can be reached through consultations, the disputes shall be sub-
mitted to - Arbitration Organization in for ar-
bitration in accordance with its rules of procedure. The arbitral award is final
and binding upon both parties.
A more extensive sample dispute resolution clause can be found in Surrey & Soble, Re-
cent Developments in Dispute Resolution in The People's Republic of China, in LEGAL As-
PECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA 375, 428-30 (J. Cohen ed. 1983).
90. Ellis & Shea, supra note 14, at 162.
91. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
92. See Chew, supra note 16, at 267; Klitgaard, People's Republic of China Joint Ven-
ture Dispute Resolution Procedures, I UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. I, 6 (1982); MCMILLAN, supra
note 50, at 7, who groups friendly negotiations together with conciliation.
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their continuation, and should one party wish, conciliation may be
initiated. 3
The prime function of these negotiations is to "seek truth
through facts" so as to enable the parties to search for a settlement
that honors the contract terms and the law. When these objectives
are met using this process, then it is very effective, particularly since
the parties reach the settlement themselves. In one instance of
friendly negotiations, a dispute involving the cancellation of two or-
ders for wheat and cotton by the Chinese party, the settlement ar-
rived at was for the Chinese party to pay "cover" damages, as in the
Uniform Commercial Code. " If on the other hand the parties can-
not settle their dispute without the assistance of a third party, concil-
iation may be conducted.
B. Conciliation
Similar to conciliation conducted in the United States, this
method involves the use of a third party or parties to assist the dis-
putants in reaching a settlement. At this stage, the conciliators do
not suggest settlements, but act as intermediaries for the disputants,
seeking facts and presenting them to the parties. The AAA and
FETAC have acted in this capacity and their agreement on joint
conciliation very likely will continue to be a vital means for parties
to conduct conciliation. Reflecting the Chinese attitude toward com-
bining, this stage has been referred to as "friendly negotiations with
the assistance of conciliators.
' '9
5
C. Joint Conciliation with Non-Binding Recommendations
Although there have been few reported instances where this
process was used, it appears that this method will be more important
than arbitration in the near term. 96 One conciliator is selected by
each party and the conciliators attempt to reach a settlement propo-
sal that will be acceptable to both parties.97 The recommendations
made are non-binding in nature and as such are more palatable to
the Chinese. The agreement between AAA and FETAC for joint
conciliation facilitated the settlement of two disputes using this
method, although in one case it took nearly three years from the
93. See Lockett, supra note 1, at 260.
94. Id. at 261. The confidentiality of alternative dispute resolution settlements makes it
extremely difficult to determine the details of any particular settlement. Hence, most discus-
sions of settlements are vague and inconclusive.
95. See loltzmann, Resolving Disputes in US-China Trade, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF Do-
ING BUSINESS WITH CHINA 81 (H. Holtzmann ed. 1976). This book is the predecessor to the
1979 version edited by H. Holtzmann and W. Surrey, supra note 16.
96. See Chew, supra note 16, at 268-69.
97. WETTER, supra note 54, at 268-69, suggests that this stage consists of a more infor-
mal process whereby any conciliator will do.
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initiation of the friendly negotiations to the arrival of a settlement.98
Three years is still far too long for this method to be considered an
efficient means of dispute resolution. However, the uncertainty with
which both parties proceeded was due in large part to their unfamili-
arity with the process. Holtzmann believes the process would run
more smoothly if a uniform set of rules was in place. To this end he
suggests adoption of the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, which
were pending at the time of his book.99
D. Arbitration
Should the parties fail to reach a settlement through the first
three techniques, arbitration is available. Although arbitration in
United States-China trade is the subject of numerous law review ar-
ticles, 100 there are apparently no reported cases of arbitration, None-
theless, arbitration serves a valuable function by providing a familiar
approach to dispute resolution for American companies unaccus-
tomed to the voluntary methods employed by China.
Parties are free to develop an arbitration clause which suits
their particular needs and desires, and a broad variety have been
used in China trade. Initially, the most common clauses called for
arbitration in Beijing using FETAC rules. Although these rules have
been unchanged since they were promulgated in 1956, they are
somewhat similar to rules used by the AAA. Arbitration by FETAC
is not restricted to use of its own rules, yet no instances have been
reported of FETAC using other rules. Recent trends indicate an in-
creasing flexibility regarding the rules and location to be used for
arbitration.
Indicative of this flexibility is the increase in the use of "third
country" arbitration clauses. Both the 1979 Trade Agreement 01 and
China's Joint Venture Law"'2 contain language approving the use of
arbitration in a third country of the parties' choice, using the rules of
that forum, UNCITRAL or those rules expressly agreed to by the
parties.' 03 The standard form contracts of the FTCs also reflect an
acceptance of third country arbitration. 104 These clauses appear to
98. See Holtzmann, supra note 16, at 291-317.
99. Id. at 317-18. The UNCITRAL conciliation rules were adopted by the General
Assembly in 1980. See 1981 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 165-90. (Int'l Council for Comm. Arb.).
100. E.g., Klitgaard, supra note 92; Chew, supra note 16 and infra note 106; Lockett,
supra note 2; Theroux, supra note 56; Theroux, supra note 2; Ellis & Shea, supra note 14;
Comment, supra note 5. For a thorough if slightly outdated view of arbitration procedures
used in the case of disputes involving foreign entities, see Hsiao, China's Foreign Trade Or-
ganization, 22 VAND. L. REV. 503, 514-18 (1969).
101. Article VIII, para. 2 of the 1979 Trade Agreement, supra note 1.
102. Article 14 of the Joint Venture Law, supra note 39.
103. See Theroux, supra note 2, at 239-40, 250.
104. See supra note 90.
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be replacing the previous standard clauses specifying arbitration in
the country of the defendant, 108 a practice which had become a stan-
dard in international trade prior to the growth of the independent
arbitration bodies such as the International Chamber of Commerce,
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) and the acceptance of
the UNCITRAL arbitration rules. The arbitration clauses in some
standard contracts also indicate a desire to make the arbitration de-
cision binding and not subject to appeal. 106
IX. Evaluation of the Alternatives: Efficient Techniques or a Hob-
son's Choice
As can be seen from the flexibility accorded parties to arrange
arbitration to suit their needs, the availability of arbitration in
United States-China trade is becoming representative of modern in-
ternational trade practices. One would assume that if the methods
are efficient, then the methods would be used when parties had dis-
putes. To what, then, can the absence of arbitrations, particularly in
the early years of United States-China trade,107 be attributed? Is it
the efficiency of the other methods available, the aversion to arbitra-
tion, a simple lack of disputes, or perhaps a combination of these and
other factors?
A method for dispute resolution is efficient if it allows two rea-
sonable disputing parties to reach a just settlement in a reasonable
105. Clauses specifying arbitration in the country of the defendant are not advised.
These clauses provide an incentive for parties to breach contracts or otherwise attempt to
position themselves as the defendant in any prospective dispute.
106. Arbitration decisions are final and binding under FETAC rules. See Mitchell &
Stein, United States-China Commercial Contracts, 20 INT'L LAW 897, 911 (1986). Over 90%
of United States-China contracts provide for Beijing or Stockholm as the situs of arbitration.
Id. A questionnaire on arbitration by the NCUST to its members revealed that of 29 respon-
dents who had dealings with China, 26 members had entered into contracts with dispute settle-
ment clauses. Of these 26 clauses, 10 provided for Sweden as the place or arbitration. Ques-
tionnaire Responses: Dispute Settlement and Penalty Clauses in U.S.-P.R.C. Contracts,
National Council for U.S.-China Trade (April 15, 1981) [hereinafter NCUST Survey]. Of
these 10, four of these contracts provided, in addition for the use of the rules of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, for use of "Swedish Arbitration Procedure," one provided for use of
the "laws of Sweden," one provided for use of the "laws of Sweden," and one provided for use
of UNCITRAL rules. These results are consistent with the survey results of Rosalie Tung. See
Tung, supra note 60, at 56-73 (1984). The Chinese preference for Sweden as the preferred
locale of third-country arbitration may result from Swedish rules that apply the law of the
country with the closest contacts to the contract, which will usually be China in the U.S.-
China trade context. Other factors, such as the reputation of the Swedish for neutrality and
the historical acceptance of Sweden as an arbitration locale by the U.S.S.R., may also contrib-
ute to the Chinese preference for Sweden. See Chew, A Procedural and Substantive Analysis
of The Fairness of Chinese and Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitrations, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 291
(1986).
107. For instance, in the NCUST Survey, supra note 106, none of the respondents re-
ported any experience in the application of arbitration clauses. FETAC has become an increas-
ingly popular arbitral forum in recent years. See supra note 56. But as of 1986, there were still
no reported arbitrations involving U.S. firms. See M. FERGUSON, supra note 54, at 22; see also
Surrey, Dispute Settlement in U.S.-China Trade - Another Look in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DO-
ING BUSINESS WITH CHINA 279, 287 (1985).
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period of time, with a minimum of intervention, while preserving
their relationship and ensuring that the needs of both parties are rec-
ognized and honored.'08 If evaluated against this standard the op-
tions available in United States-China trade are very efficient. If im-
proved by the implementation of rules on conciliation as suggested
by Holtzmann, the increased certainty might streamline the concilia-
tion process even more, resulting in more prompt settlements. Even
though the methods are efficient, conciliation has not been used to
any great extent, so the lack of arbitration cannot be attributed to
the smooth functioning of conciliation or joint conciliation with non-
binding recommendations. By the same token, no matter how effi-
cient "friendly negotiations" might be, they are not so unique as to
cause the elimination of so many disputes that only two disputes
progressed beyond that stage.
Notably, the Chinese disinclination toward arbitration appears
to have received more attention by commentators 109 than it may
merit. Given their penchant for abiding by the terms of a contract
and the law, it is inconceivable that they would consistently agree to
arbitration terms were they not ready to submit to arbitration,
should the need arise. The growing acceptance of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce and its rules and the UNCITRAL rules re-
flect Chinese confidence in the fairness of arbitration, as well as a
pragmatic acceptance of current international trade practices. While
the Chinese may be mildly opposed to arbitration, and the concept of
combination dictates that conciliation and friendly negotiations con-
tinue during arbitration, neither of these factors is so unusual to
cause the settlement of over ninety percent of disputes prior to arbi-
tration for all cases involving China's trade with other countries. Nor
does it explain why there have been only two reported instances of
joint conciliation, because the Chinese are clearly not averse to such
method of dispute resolution.
Perhaps, then, the most significant factor contributing to the
lack of arbitrations and conciliations is simply the lack of disputes. If
one accepts the postulate that the shortage of arbitrations and con-
ciliations is due not to shortcomings in the methods of dispute resolu-
tion, but instead to a shortage of disputes, then the inquiry must
shift to the root question: Why are there so few disputes?
108. The concepts of principled negotiations suggested by Fisher and Ury are also help-
ful in determining whether an alternative dispute resolution technique is in fact principled. The
standards for principled negotiation are described in R. FISHER AND W. URY, GETTING TO
YES; NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN, 11-14 (1981).
109. See supra note 100.
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X. Factors Mitigating Against Disputes
Determining the cause of disputes and predicting areas over
which disputes are likely to develop is a relatively easy task. One can
ask the parties what they disagree over or what was the most diffi-
cult clause to reach an accord on during contract negotiations. One
can examine contractual language and determine disparate treat-
ment which is likely to cause future problems. 1 The confidentiality
of friendly negotiations, conciliation and arbitration tends to limit
the amount of information available to the researcher or counsel
seeking to determine precedent or obtain background information,
but predicting likely areas of dispute in particular cases is not
difficult.
Although it is possible to determine over which areas disputes
will occur, only conjecture can be used to reason why disputes have
not occurred. Examination of the analogy between a defense contrac-
tor seeking development and production contracts and a United
States company seeking to develop a long-term relationship with
China may help explain the paucity of disputes in the early stages of
United States-China trade. In defense contracting, the potential for
obtaining a long-term production contract with its associated larger
value leads to a tendency to "buy in" to a less favorable development
contract."' Similarly, large defense contractors are generally reluc-
tant to lodge a protest or claim against the government for fear of
damaging their long-term relationship with government procurement
officers.
The same factors exist in trade with China. American compa-
nies aware of the tremendous potential of China trade and the Chi-
nese loyalty to "old friends" may be avoiding disputes in order to
develop long-term trading relationships that ultimately will make up
for any losses suffered in the near-term. Similarly, the traditional
value the Chinese place on long-term relationships may be a prime
factor for their failure to initiate disputes.1 12 As simple as this theory
might seem, the short trading history between the two countries and
the tremendous future potential of bilateral trade readily suggest
such a pragmatic approach; however, continued trade experience
may reveal a more intricate explanation for the dearth of disputes, or
110. See discussion of unique business aspects of trade with China, supra notes 52-62
and accompanying text.
I 11. The dollar value of development contracts for a defense project is approximately
10-20% of the total program acquisition cost. Thus a company can afford to make minimal
profit to win either the development contract or the early production series contracts in order
to gain a competitive advantage for the full-scale production contracts. For example, one con-
tract with which the author is familiar involved approximately $80 million in research and
development with nearly $1 billion in production.
112. E.g., Holtzmann, supra note 16, at 276-77.
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add factors hitherto irrelevant. 11 3
XI. Conclusion: An Opportunity for Preventive Lawyering
If dispute resolution techniques are not being utilized, then
counsel should change the focus of advice for clients seeking to do
business with China. Assuming the Chinese are opposed to any litig-
ious proceedings and similarly averse to any form of dispute, the
prime function of counsel should be to prevent disputes through the
role of "counselor" as suggested by Chief Judge Re. 114 Granted,
counsel should be familiar with provisions for dispute resolution
clauses in contracts. In view of the growing acceptance of arbitration
in Sweden under the SCC rules, these clauses should be easily nego-
tiated into future contracts. However, the selection of the proper ar-
bitration clause in a contract will by no means fulfill counsel's obli-
gation regarding dispute resolution.
On the contrary, the selection of the clause should become sec-
ond nature and part of the standard form contracts. The true role of
counselor is only fulfilled through advising the client on how to con-
duct negotiations and business in such a manner that the arbitration
clauses are never used. 5 Therefore, among the most important in-
formation counsel can provide to clients is that which imparts an
understanding of the Chinese attitude toward law and international
trade.
The opportunity is available to embark on a new and revolution-
ary area of lawyering. That almost fifty billion dollars in trade has
already occurred without apparently a single law suit and with no
reported arbitrations suggests that disputes need not arise at all in
order to be resolved. The coming challenge for United States counsel
will be to maintain this unusually amicable record as United States
investment in and trade with China grows, and while the Chinese
themselves grapple to establish a formal legal system.
As investors establish long-term relationships, they may no
longer be willing to absorb short-term losses, and disputes may in-
crease. This result, however, is not inevitable. If counsel can provide
foreign negotiators with an understanding of the Chinese perspective
from the start of negotiations, trade can grow while disputes are
avoided. This area of China trade thus presents American lawyers
113. More disputes may arise as U.S. companies establish long-term positions for them-
selves in China. Companies having an incentive to forsake disputes in the short-term for a
larger market share do not necessarily have this same incentive over the long-term.
114. See Re, supra note 8.
115. "The lawyer, when acting as counselor, performs a function that is extremely bene-
ficial to society, in that effective legal counseling minimizes the likelihood of conflict between
parties by stabilizing relationships and promoting understanding and cooperation." Re, supra
note 8, at 691-92 (emphasis in the original).
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with an ideal opportunity to fulfill their role of "counselor," not sim-
ply facilitating the resolution of disputes (or sometimes even exacer-
bating disputes as "advocate"), but preventing disputes from arising
in the first place.

